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RECENT PROBLEMS UNDER SECTION 2(d)
OF THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
As each year passes, commentaries on the vicissitudes, anomalies and prac-
tical problems of the Robinson-Patman Act continue to be written. This
twenty-fifth anniversary year of the controversial amendment to the Clayton
Act promises little limitation on such proliferation by scholars and practi-
tioners. The impact of the 1959 Term's Broch case on the administration and
substance of section 2(c) has been extensively assessed in the legal journals.'
The language and scope of the Supreme Court's analysis of section 2(e) in the
1958 Term Simplicity Patterns decision has been equally searched and re-
searched for answers to other ambiguities in the act.2 The reason for such out-
pourings is plain enough: any federal statute so inartistically drafted and
whose impact reaches into every aspect of the businessman's distributive and
pricing process causes concern in the market place and delight in academia.
Only one subsection, however, remains to be directly construed by the
Supreme Court3-the so-called "advertising allowance" section 2(d), which
forbids payment by a seller for "services and facilities" furnished by a cus-
tomer unless such payment is made available to all competing customers on
"proportionally equal terms."4 Supreme Court dicta in cases concerning other
I FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166 (1960) (Justices Whittaker, Frankfurter,
Harlan, and Stewart, dissenting). The Broch case in the Seventh Circuit was noted in two law
reviews, while the Supreme Court reversal has been examined in no less than eleven journals.
See, e.g., 74 HAxv. L. REv. 169 (1960); 29 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 178 (1960); 109 U. PA. L.
REv. 630 (1961); 28 U. CHi. L. Rav. 505 (1961).
2 FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959). Simplicity, like Broch, has not suf-
fered from a dearth of reaction in the law reviews. See, e.g., 45 Cornr.LL L. Q. 349 (1960); 28
GEo. WAsH. L. Rav. 671 (1960); 38 TExAs L. Rav. 631 (1960).
3 Technically, the Supreme Court has reviewed a section 2(d) case, but the matter at issue
was whether or not ajudicial order was appropriate with reference to parts of a Commission
order that had not been violated in a contempt proceeding. Thus, no substantive question of
interpretation was presented. FTC v. American Crayon Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955); 352 U.S.
806 (1956).
4 Section 2(d) provides: "That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to
pay or contract for the payment of anything of value to or for the benefit of a customer of
such person in the course of such commerce as compensation or in consideration for any
services or facilities furnished by or through such customer in connection with the process-
ing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of any products or commodities manufactured, sold,
or offered for sale by such person, unless such payment or consideration is available on pro-
portionally equal terms to all other customers competing in the distribution of such products
or commodities." 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(d)
(1958).
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sections have, of course, been some aid,5 but federal court decisions have been
sparse until the last few years.6 The Federal Trade Commission's opinion in
the 1953 Soap cases,7 for example, and the Commission's Guides for Advertis-
ing Allowances and Other Merchandising Payments and Services, adopted May
19, 1960, are significant attempts at the administrative level to make the sec-
tion workable for the businessman and his counselor.8 Many problems, how-
ever, still remain to be resolved by the courts as the Commission intensifies its
activity under the section. 9 Furthermore, recent Commission opinions have
been characterized by strong dissents.10 An investigation of new developments
and current issues, then, once again seems warranted."
5 Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945) (section 2(e)); FTC v. Morton Salt
Co., 334 U.S. 37, 55 (1948) (section 2(a)); Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 73
(1953) (section 2(0); FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 65 (1959) (section 2(e)).
6 Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958); State Wholesale Grocers
v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 258 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1958) cert. denied sub nom. General
Foods Corp. v. State Wholesale Grocers, 358 U.S. 947 (1959); P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 267
F.2d 439 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 923 (1959); Swanee Paper Corp. v. FTC, 291
F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1961).
7 Lever Bros. Co., 50 F.T.C. 494 (1953).
8 The Guides of course are not technically binding on either the Commission or the courts,
nor have they gone without criticism. See Shniderman, Collateral Discrimination under the
Robinson-Patman Act-Section 2(c), (d) and (e), in 17 ADA ANTrrxusr SECTION 410 (1960).
Earlier, in 1954, the FTC had promulgated Trade Practice Rules for the Cosmetic Industry,
largely to obviate some of the practical difficulties arising from Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp.
v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945). The Rules are set
forth in 3 CCH TRADE REO. REP. 20221 (1954).
9 From October 1, 1956, to August 1, 1960, 190 of the 319 Robinson-Patman complaints
were issued under the provisions of 2(c) and 2(d). Rowe, Expectation Versus Accomplish-
ment Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 1936-1960, in 17 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 298, 311
n.52 (1960). An FTC Press Release, July 3, 1960, noted that 463 members of the food in-
dustry are being investigated for possible advertising and promotional allowance violations.
10 See Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., No. 6642, FTC, September 9, 1959 (Kern, dissent-
ing); Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc., No. 6966, FTC, October 31, 1960 (Tait, dissenting);
Grand Union Co., No. 6973, August 12, 1960 (Tait, dissenting).
It As suggested earlier, the literature on section 2(d) is voluminous. The most recent
valuable commentaries can be found in Shniderman, supra note 8, at 411-21; EDWARDS,
THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAW 153-207 (1959); AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND
RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 117-56 (rev. ed. 1959).
Other studies, articles, and comments arranged chronologically include: Comment, The
Robinson-Patman Act in Action, 46 YALE L.J. 447, 465-72 (1937); Dunn, Sections 2(d) and
(e), in CCH ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT SYMPoSIuM 55 (1946); FELDMAN & ZORN, ADVERTISING
AND PROMOTIONAL ALLOWANCES (1948); Layton, Demonstrators on Proportionally Equal
Terms, in CCH ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT SYMpOSiuM 38 (1948); Comment, 52 MICIo. L. REv.
1198 (1954); ATT'y GEN. NAT'L CoMM. AwNTRusr REP. 189-93 (1955); Rowe, How to
Comply with Sections 2(c)-(f), in CCH ANTITRurST LAW SYmposiuM 124, 131-36 (1957);
Fisher, Sections 2(D) and(E) of the Robinson-Patman Act: Babel Revisited, I I VAND. L. REv.
453 (1958).
For reviews of the federal cases and FTC proceedings in 1959 and 1960, see Kintner,
Resurgens: The Federal Trade Commission in 1959, in CCH ANTITRUsr LAW SYMPOSIUM 30,
36-38 (1960); Kintner, The Federal Trade Commission in 1960-Apologia Pro Vita Nostra, in
CCH ANTITRUST LAW SympOSiUM 21, 31-33 (1961); Oppenheim, Developments in Antitrust
During the Past Year, in 17 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 33, 116-20 (1960).
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General considerations of section 2(d) will first be traced to present the
background necessary for a closer examination of particular problems in the
application of the section. Specific advertising and promotional arrangements
in the food industry will then be discussed, especially the "Anniversary" and
"Special" sales, brand names, and the "Chain Lightning" promotion initiated
by the broadcasting and television industry. The recent Liggett & Myers pro-
ceeding' 2 will be examined in order to throw a fuller light on the important
"indirect customer" conundrum. Finally, the problem most likely to first
reach the Supreme Court under section 2(d)-whether or not the meeting-
competition defense of section 2(b) is available to the respondent in a 2(d)
charge-will be analyzed.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Section 2(d) was enacted to prevent a prevalent form of indirect price dis-
crimination, whereby large purchasers received special discounts and rebates
purportedly for advertising and promotional services, which, however, were
usually never furnished.' 3 Section 2(e) was later added to the original bill to
supplement 2(d) so as to cover the seller's unjust furnishing of facilities and
services as juxtaposed to paying for them.14 The practices most common at the
time of the act's adoption were joint advertising and in-store promotion of the
seller's goods by the customer.15 Thus the section's main concern was with
merchandising services rendered in connection with the resale of consumer
goods. But the potential ambit of the sections' coverage was not delineated, as
the oft-quoted remarks of Congressman Utterback, Chairman of the House
conferees at the time of the act's passage, suggest:
The existing evil at which this part of the bill is aimed is, of course, the
grant of discriminations under the guise of payments for advertising and
promotional services which, whether or not the services are actually ren-
dered as agreed, results in an advantage to the customer so favored as
compared with others who have to bear the cost of such services them-
selves. The prohibitions of the bill, however, are made intentionally broader
than this one sphere, in order to prevent evasion in resort to others by
which the same purpose might be accomplished, and it prohibits payment
12 Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., No. 6642, FTC, September 9, 1959.
13 See S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936); H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1936).
14 EDWARDS, op. cit. supra note 11, at 51. The text of section 2(e) provides: "That it shall
be unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor of one purchaser against another pur-
chaser or purchasers of a commodity bought for resale, with or without processing, by con-
tracting to furnish or furnishing, or by contributing to the furnishing of, any services or
facilities connected with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of such commodity
so purchased upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on proportionally equal terms." 49
S.at. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1958).
5 See S. Doc. No. 89, 73d Cong., 2d',$ess. (1934).
for such services or facilities, whether furnished "in connection with the
processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale" of the products concerned. 16
The varieties of promotional and merchandising arrangements to which
section 2(d) may apply are manifold. Any kind of advertising, handbills, win-
dow and floor displays, "push money" paid to clerks and salesmen of the
customers, demonstrators, and giveaways are only a sample of day-to-day
practices covered by the section. 17 In its narrowest form, the allowance might
be paid for a specific advertisement placed in a particular media. In its broad-
est form, the allowance may be for co-operation between buyer and seller
closely related to a functional discount.18 Because of this potential overlap
with other sections of the act, a comparison will be of some value in indicating
the general development and coverage of 2(d).
Section 2(a) prohibits direct and indirect discrimination in price that may
result in injury to competition or competitors, with certain affirmative de-
fenses permitted by.the provisos.19 Section 2(d), on the other hand, is given an
automatic character similar to sections 2(c) and 2(e), unless the seller can
prove the requisite proportionality. Failure to comply thus means illegality
per se, as under prevailing interpretations the Commission need not prove
injurious effects on competition, 20 nor may the seller resort to cost justifica-
tion. 21 Motive and lawful intent are equally irrelevant under 2(d), despite the
weight the FTC usually gives such factors.22 Although the meeting-competi-
16 80 CoNG. REc. 9418 (1936). (Emphasis added.)
17 See FTC Guides for Advertising Allowances and Other Merchandising Payments and
Services 3 (May 19,1960); FEmAN & ZoRN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 88; EDwARsM op. cit.
supra note 11, at 174-75.
Is See, for example, the Commission cases against American Crayon Co. and Binney &
Smith Co., where school suppliers used advertising allowances to set up a special functional
class of distributors. American Crayon Co., 32 F.T.C. 306 (1940); Binney & Smith Co., 32
F.T.C. 315 (1940). The Commission unsuccessfully challenged, as merchandising allowances
under 2(d), General Foods' discount of ten per cent to special distributors for wagon de-
livery of institutional grocery products. Instead, a violation of 2(a) was found. General
Foods Corp., 52 F.T.C. 798 (1956). Accord, Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co., No. 7718,
FTC, October 10, 1960.
19 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a)-(b) (1958),
20 State Wholesale Grocers v. Great AtL & Pac. Tea Co., 258 F.2d 831, 839 (7th Cir.
1958); FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 65 (1959) (dictum). Injury is of course
relevant in private suits to establish damages. See National Nut Co. v. Kelling Nut Co., 61
F. Supp. 76, 83 (N.D. Ill. 1945). In one case, cost savings to the manufacturer were reflected
in the service of a chain buyer distributing price lists. Chicago Seating Co. v. S. Karpen &
Bros., 177 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1949).
21 Cf. Oliver Bros., Inc. v. FTC, 102 F.2d 763, 767 (4th Cir. 1939).
22 "It is apparent that Congress has not made relevant the motive or intent of him who
pays or contracts to pay." State Wholesale Grocers v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 258
F.2d 831,837 (7th Cir. 1958). "This section of the Act does not concern itself with motive or
intention. It is only concerned with the consequences which flow from an act.... The Com-
mission.., went farther than required... ." P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 267 F.2d 439,444 (3d
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tion defense has been allowed in 2(e) proceedings, it is not yet available
under 2(d).23
Because marketing allowances and services can be regarded as indirect dis-
criminations in price, section 2(a) can be said to be applicable to any 2(d) situa-
tion. In two cases the Commission proceeded against buyers who had received
payments for advertising, on the theory that such payments were a subterfuge
for illegal discounts that impaired competition in ways forbidden by 2(a).24
Equally anomalous to the conceptual structure of the act is the forced choice
of sections as the seller-customer co-operation approaches a functional dis-
count.25 If the service of the customer is recognized by the seller through spe-
cific payments for promotional activity, 2(d) applies. If the seller recognizes
the usefulness of a customer's merchandising through a discount without
policing and designating the services, its legality is judged by the different and
more flexible standards of 2(a).26
.The theory of the brokerage provision, section 2(c),2 7 envisages buyer and
seller dealing at arms-length with only the intermediary broker justifiably paid
for bringing the two together. Both sections 2(d) and 2(e), however, are pre-
mised on the belief that buyer and seller can furnish important facilities and
services for each other. While the brokerage section in theory applies to the
first sale of goods and 2(d) to their resale, the Carpel case revealed that there
may be situations where a lump-sum payment encompasses both types of
transactions. 28 In this case, District Grocery Stores (D.G.S.), an organization
of 275 retail grocers, was paid $5,000 yearly to promote Carpel's frosted food
line, with D.G.S. passing on to its retail members a credit of two per cent on all
purchases of Carpel products. The Commission found that Carpel and D.G.S.
Cir. 1959). (Emphasis added.) But see Lever Bros. Co., 50 F.T.C. 494, 512 (1953), where the
Commission stated, "[The plan] must be honest in its purpose and fair and reasonable in its
application," quoted with apparent approval in FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55,
61 n.4 (1959). A plan might be beyond reproach in its purpose but still violative of the sec-
tion.
23 Henry Rosenfeld, Inc., 52 F.T.C. 1535 (1956). The problem is discussed in Part V
infra.
24 Miami Wholesale Drug Co., 28 F.T.C. 485 (1939); Atlantic City Wholesale Drug Co.,
38 F.T.C. 631 (1944). The charges were brought under section 2(f), 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15
U.S.C. § 13(f) (1958), which makes it unlawful for the buyer to "knowingly" induce or re-
ceive a prohibited discrimination in price.
25 See cases and discussion in note 18 supra.
26 See generally EDwARDs, op. cit. supra note II, at 155, 175-76; Fischer, supra note 11,
at 457-66; Rowe, supra note 11. In Champion Spark Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30 (1953), the 2(d)
charge was found to be covered in the 2(a) count, for the discounts given by the manufac-
turer for special sales services were discounts on the invoices off the billing listing, hence
found to be merely a flat reduction in price.
27 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1958).
28 Carpel Frosted Foods, Inc., 48 F.T.C. 581 (1951), discussed in EDwARDS, op. cit.
;upra note 11, at 179-80.
had both violated the brokerage section and Carpel had violated the advertis-
ing-allowance provision in making payments to D.G.S. not proportionally
available to others. A portion of the $5,000 was held to be in payment for in-
ducing members to handle Carpel products, activities equivalent to the func-
tions of a broker, while the balance was found to be for advertising and pro-
motional services.
Since sections 2(d) and 2(e) deal in large part with similar transactions, they
are generally considered companion sections.2 9 Both embody the "propor-
tionally equal terms" standard to payments by the seller in the former and
services furnished by the seller in the latter. There are, however, discrepancies
between the two sections in the language used. "Engaged in commerce" and
"in the course of such commerce" have been read into section 2(e) to save its
constitutionality.30 The limitation in 2(a) to goods of "like grade and quality"
has also been applied to 2(d) and (e). 31 Section 2(d) uses the term "customers
competing," while section 2(e) only uses the word "purchasers." Since the
terms were used interchangeably throughout the legislative history,32 they are
generally regarded by the FTC as meaning the same thing.33
Who is a "purchaser" or "customer" under 2(d) and (e), however, is of con-
siderable practical importance, for a favorable determination of this issue will
exempt a respondent from these sections. For example, the Student Books
decision ruled out the application of section 2(e) to consignees. 34 Since "cus-
tomers" may arguably be a broader term than "purchasers," commissions to
consignees theoretically might be covered. 35 The General Foods ruling by the
FTC refused to apply section 2(d) where the payments were not made in con-
nection with the "resale of goods bought by [the customer]." 36 Thus, consign-
2 9 See Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988, 990 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945); AUSTIN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 120, 123.
30 The omission was held "inadvertent." Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co.,
supra note 29. Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. FTC, 156 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331
U.S. 806 (1947).
31Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958); Golf Ball Mfg. Ass'n,
26 F.T.C. 824 (1938).
32 See FELDMAN & ZORN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 119.
33 Guide 12. See Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. FTC, 156 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946).
For further discussion of the discrepancy between the sections, see EDwARDs, op. cit.
supra note 11, at 153 n.1; AUSTIN, Op. cit. supra note 11, at 124-25, 137-42.
34 Student Book Co. v. Washington Law Book Co., 232 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 988 (1956).
35 See the illuminating discussion in Rowe, Discriminatory Sales of Commodities in Com-
merce: Jurisdictional Criteria under the Robinson-Patman Act, 67 YALE L.J. 1155, 1157-58
(1958).
36 General Foods Corp., 52 F.T.C. 798, 828 (1956). State Wholesale Grocers v. Great
At. & Pac. Tea Co., 258 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1958), however, is probably contrary, for there
payments made to A & P's wholly owned magazine, Woman's Day, were held to be within
the ambit of 2(d), even though some suppliers did not sell their grocery products in A & P
stores. See Note, 72 HARv. L. REv. 1389 (1959).
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ment arrangements, already prevalent in the gasoline and publishing indus-
tries, appear to be increasing in popularity in other areas as well. Private
litigation in Ludwig "v. American Greetings Corp.37 has resulted in immuniza-
tion of that practice for a manufacturer of greeting cards and paper supplies.3 8
Commission charges and treble damage suits under both sections have
struck at a variety of commercial accommodations seemingly beyond typical
promotional arrangements. Such complaints have included allowances for
runway deliveries of cans, 39 furnishing of price lists,40 sales return privileges,41
payroll deductions, 42 warehousing discounts,43 special packaging, 4 and cou-
pon books.4 5 The outer limits of sections 2(d) and 2(e) are thus still to be
defined.
When the businessman intends to enter into a promotional and advertising
arrangement with his customers, practical problems proliferate. As mentioned
earlier, however, the Guides and Commission opinions do present some stand-
ards that may be followed. The meaning of the "proportionally equal terms"
phrase is an initial.determination. 46 The safest course to follow is to base the
payments made on the dollar volume or on the quantity of goods purchased
during a specified time.47 The Supreme Court in Simplicity Pattern noted with
approval the relatively flexible and broad scope the FTC had accorded the
siandard. 48 Thus, the section does not prohibit a seller from paying different
amounts for services of various types. For example, the Commission upheld a
gradated discount per case of soap depending on whether the customer fur-
nished Lever Brothers with newspaper advertising, handbills, or store dis-
plays. 49 Until October of 1960, it was thought that rendering of services could
37 282 F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1960), appeal dismissed per curiam; 366 U.S. 269 (1961).
38 This does not mean, however, that higher prices charged to consignees' competing
customers may not violate section 2(a).
39 Russellville Canning Co. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 484, 498-99 (W.D. Ark.
1949), rev'd, 191 F.2d 38, 56 (8th Cir. 1951).
4
o Chicago Seating Co. v. S. Karpen & Bros., 177 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1949).
41 Students Book Co. v. Washington Law Book Co., 232 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
42 Skinner v. United States Steel Corp., 233 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1956).
43 Lambert Phannacal Co., 31 F.T.C. 734 (1940).
44 Luxor Ltd., 31 F.T.C. 658 (1940).
45 Idaho Canning Co., No. 7495, FTC News Release, May 22, 1961 (consent order).
46 EDWARDS, op. cit. supra note 11, at 156-64 has an interesting discussion. For an earlier
mathematical computation of considerable complexity, see Layton, supra note 11. An at-
tempt to hold the standard unconstitutionally vague was unsuccessful in Elizabeth Arden,
Inc. v. FTC, 156 F.2d 132 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 806 (1946).
47 Guide 7.
48 FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 61 n.4 (1959). ATr'y GEN. NAT'L COMM.
ANTITRusr REp. 189-90 (1955) also has registered approval.
49 Lever Bros. Co., 50 F.T.C. 494 (1953). See also examples in Guide 9.
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be used to supplement payments in order to satisfy the requirements of propor-
tionality.5O However, an FTC Hearing Examiner's opinion of that month ruled
that such a combination was not allowable.SI
A comprehensive plan should be proferred openly by the supplier,5 2 al-
though general publicity in a trade journal may not be sufficient notice.5 3 The
seller has an affirmative duty not only to inform all customers but also to
police the buyer's performance under the plan.S4 "Reasonable precautions"
must be taken to see that the services furnished are not being overpayed and,
further, are being properly used.55 Recent Commission complaints have fre-
quently charged payment in excess of value accrued.5 6 Finally, the courts and
Commission have both determined that the burden of showing the reasonable-
.ness of the plan and the availability of its proportionality is on the respond-
ent.57
Despite the usual criticism, allowances and services are more broadly avail-
able than before. When such payments are made, care is usually taken to see
that the advertising is actually provided. Although it is true that it is difficult to
engage in selective advertising, whether or not competition is harmed, some
5o Guide 9, ex. 2.
S The Hearing Examiner's holding is, of course, far from conclusive, for the FTC did not
expressly pass on the point. Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc., No. 6966, FTC, October 31, 1960
(Tait, dissenting).
52 Guide 6; Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., No. 6642, FTC, September 9, 1959. The
Commission, hom ever, once failed to prove its case against a food supplier who had not
announced a plan. Atalanta Trading Corp., 53 F.T.C. 565, 570 (1956), rev'd sub nom.
Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365, 372 (2d Cir. 1958).
53 Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc., No. 6966, FTC, October 31, 1960. See Shnider-
man, supra note 8, at 417 for a discussion of the practical problems this ruling presents.
54 Guide 11. . 55 Ibid.
56 See, e.g., Regina Corp., No. 8421, FTC News Release, June 20, 1961; Giant Food,
Inc. No. 6459, FTC, June 1, 1961. An earlier egregious example is American Co-op. 'Serum
Ass'n v. Anchor Serum Co., 153 F.2d 907 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 721 (1946),
where payments in 1937 were $8,666, while expenditures amounted to only $648.
A related problem occurs in advertising promotional schemes through newspapers. Na-
tional rates are always in excess of local rates, with the result that an overpayment invariably
occurs when the customer is reimbursed at the higher rates. But the national rates are what
the seller would have to pay were he himself placing the ads. See Simiderman, supra note 8,
at 419-20; see generally FELDMAN & ZoRN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 3-45; cf. the private
suit under the Sherman Act, alleging that such a practice initiated by a newspaper was evi-
dence of intent to monopolize, in Scott Publishing Co. v. Columbia Basin Publishers, Inc.,
293 F.2d 15, 22 n.14 (9th Cir. 1961).
57 State Wholesale Grocers v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 258 F.2d 831, 838 (7th Cir.
1958) ("The burden is upon the party who seeks the protection of the exception....");
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., No. 6642, p. 6, FTC, September 9, 1959 ("The question of
the availability of payments to others on proportionally equal terms is a matter of defense
to be established by the respondent upon the prima facie showing of discriminatory pay-
ments. .. ."). See the related practice challenged by the FTC in North American Phillips
Co., 55 F.T.C. (1958); Westinghouse Elec. Corp., No. 7150, FTC, Oct. 13, 1959.
1961]
168 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:160
workable standards have been evolved so that the businessman need not neces-
sarily rush blindly into illegality. As suggested above, however, problems still
remain. It is to four of these areas that this comment now turns.
I. SPECIAL SAmS AND BRAND NAMES IN THE FOOD INDUSTRY
No industry's system of distribution is more closely related to the purposes
behind the Robinson-Patman Act than the food industry. Advertising is a
crucial factor in the expenses of both manufacturers and retailers. 58 In addi-
tion to direct advertising in national magazines, on radio and television, and
in newspapers, many food manufacturers furnish the retail trade with booklets
and leaflets, aid in the preparation of window and store displays, and share in
the cost of dealer advertising.59 Part of the solution to the problems of inde-
pendent retailers who could not obtain the tremendous allowances accorded
chains like A&P60 was found in the passage of section 2(d).
Because they are peculiarly appropriate to institutional changes and market
strategies in the food industries, advertising allowances have become even
more prevalent since the passage of the act.61 Efforts to exploit the value of
trademarks result in allowances to induce distributors to push such goods.
The increasing emphasis on packaged and processed foods underlines the im-
portance of brand names. The development of supermarkets and self-service
stores proves to the supplier and his retailer the necessity for persuading the
housewife of the quality and desirability of his product before she enters the
store. Special sales, "anniversary sales," and the promotion of brand names,
then, add a special flavor to the impact of section 2(d).
The special sale for the first time was reviewed by a federal court in Atalanta
Trading Corp. v FTC.62 In the Washington, D.C. area, Atalanta had given
Giant Food Shopping Center an allowance of $500 to push "Unox" pork
shoulder picnics for the Fourth of July, 1954. Five months after its allowance
to Giant a single sale of pork shoulder picnics had been made to a different
customer without an allowance. An allowance had also been given Giant to
promote special gift-wrapped "Unox" canned hams for the Christmas holi-
day, but was nqt afforded on a sale of "Unox" canned hams, without the spe-
cial packaging, eight months earlier. Atalanta finally had sold to Giant
"Unox" branded precooked Canadian bacon in May 1955, with which it gave
another advertising allowance. Bacon in a different form, without an allow-
ance, had been sold at the same time to other retailers, but not in the Washing-
ton area. The first two promotions were solicited by Atalanta, while the third
59 Fulda, Food Distribution in the United States, The Struggle Between Independents and
Chains, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 1051, 1084-94 (1951).
s9 See FTC, REPORT on DISTRIBUTION METHODS AND CoSTs, pt. I, 26, 27 (1944).
60 From Standard Brands, Inc. alohe, A&P received S1ZOOO a month in 1935. Id. at 15.
61 EDwARDs, THE PeucE DICRIMINATION LAw 171-74 (1959).
62 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958). No appeal was taken.
arrangement was initiated by Giant as part of its "19th Anniversary Sale."
The Commission had analyzed the promotions on the theory that all could
be considered as allowances on pork products.6 3 The Second Circuit in dis-
missing the complaint rejected this classification and also offered an alterna-
tive ground.64 Both holdings turned on an examination of the requirement of
"competing." The "products and commodities" involved were held not to be
competing because they were not of "like grade and quality." Similarly, the
different sales of the same product were not "competing" since the time dif-
ferential was too disparate. Thus the case extends to the seller the right to
limit product coverage in a promotion, tacitly acknowledges in some circum-
stances "spot" promotions and special sales, and specifically reads into 2(d)
the limitation of "like grade and quality."
The circuit court's stress of the time interval between sales as "a determin-
ing factor" 65 may raise some difficulties in future application. Since no real
standard was suggested, except that the Commission's blithe statement of "six
or eight months" was too broad, the specter of a case to case determination
seems a possibility. Some guides, however, appear possible. An earlier Com-
mission opinion 66 rejected a dress manufacturer's attempt to avoid the section
because the favored customer received an allowance in January, while the
unbenefitted customer, although buying in March, ordered no dresses in
January or February. Because the allowances accorded in that case were part
of an Easter promotion, it thus appears that seasonal patterns in particular in-
dustries can expand or contract the necessary time interval. Furthermore,
"spot" promotions on perishable goods may fare better than pushing hard
goods which can remain on the shelves for longer periods of time.
The Atalanta decision further limited the trend of Commission decisions
expanding the phrase "like grade and quality." Although confusion as to the
meaning of the phrase was apparent,67 until 1956 the FTC usually applied the
test of physical comparison of the goods.68 In the General Foods case,69 how-
ever, the FTC held that different grades of coffee when sold under a common
brand created a presumption of "like grade and quality." A private suit in
1951 aided a broad interpretation by the FTC, when "like grade and quality"
63 Atalanta Trading Corp., 53 F.T.C. 565 (1956).
64 Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958).
65 Id. at 372.
66 Kay Windsor Frocks, Inc., 51 F.T.C. 89, 96 (1954).
67 The confusion and inconsistency in Commission application is thoroughly analyzed in
Rowe, Price Differentials and Product Differentiation: The Issues under the Robinson-Patman
Act, 66 YALE L.J. 1, 9-18 (1956).
68 Champion Spark Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30 (1953); United States Rubber Co., 46 F.T.C.
998, 1006-09 (1950); Hansen Inoculator Co., 26 F.T.C. 303 (1938). See Cassady &
Grether, The Proper Interpretation of"Like Grade and Quality" Within the Meaning of Sec-
tion 2(a) ofthe Robinson-Patman Act, 30 So. CAL. L. Rn'v. 241, 244 n.13 (1957).
69 General Foods Corp., 52 F.T.C. 798 (1956).
19611 COMMENTS
170 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:160
was equated with functional interchangeability.7 0 The Hearing Examiner's de-
termination in Atalanta that "ham is ham," 7 ' however, was decidedly distaste-
ful to the Second Circuit.
The most that can be said of the court's holding on this point is that identi-
cal brands, interchangeability, and cross-elasticity of demand do not create a
presumption of "like grade and quality." 7 2 But because the opinion went on to
show that there was no cross-elasticity anyway,7 3 at minimum the court ap-
pears desirous of protecting a seller from having to yield promotions on all his
branded products in one line. An earlier statement by the Commission recog-
nizing an advertising allowance that could be confined to "slow sellers" in the
dress industry was in accord with this view.74
It has been suggested that the Second Circuit position on "like grade and
quality" is unrealistic in the light of modern market conditions. 75 When a sup-
plier promotes one product carrying his general brand name, it may be that
the sale of his like branded products is thereby also increased. Thus a dis-
crimination can result if a producer picks favored retailers to promote a prod-
uct not available to the retailers' competitors, even though the competing
stores carry other "Unox" products.7 6 If market analysis could conclusively
show that the consumer psychology in the vast majority of cases is tied to
"brand monopoly," perhaps it would be true that the seller under Atalanta
could adroitly circumvent the purposes of section 2(d). On the other hand, a
contrary decision might impair effective and sensible product differentiation,
impede product innovations, and impose onerous and expensive obligations
on an otherwise valid market strategy.77
70 Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985, 987 (S.D. Fla. 1949), aff'd, 187
F.2d 919, 924 (5th Cir.), modified on rehearing, 190 F.2d 73, 74 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 342
U.S. 875 (1951). See also the Initial Decisions in Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 51 F.T.C. 282
(1954); E. Edelmann & Co., 51 F.T.C. 978 (1955). But see ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM.
ANTiRusr REP. 158 (1955).
71 53 F.T.C. at 568. 72 258 F.2d at 371.
73 "Simply because bacon and pork come from a common source does not mean they
are of like grade and quality. There is no showing they are in the same price range; few
people eat bacon for dinner and probably even fewer eat roast pork for breakfast. Similarly
pork shoulder meat and ham are two different cuts and price-wise are not competitive...
Id. at 371 n.5.
74 "The law imposes no requirements that a seller give advertising allowances on all his
products if he elects to accord them on one or more articles." Henry Rosenfeld, Inc., 52
F.T.C. 1535, 1545 (1956).
75 Note, "Like Grade and QualitY' under § 2(d) of Robinson-Patman Act, 34 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1335, 1337-39 (1959).
76 A supplier, of course, may refuse to deal with any of his customers, assuming the
absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly. Naifeh v. Ronson Art Metal
Works, Inc., 218 F.2d 202 (10th Cir. 1954). Cf. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S.
300, 307 (1919). Accord, Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 155 (1951).
In Interesting and difficult problems also arise from the use by a manufacturer of his own
brands and the sale of his goods of "like grade and quality" to certain purchasers for resale
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Atalanta's examination of "competing" products and sales suggests a re-
lated limitation important to a seller's promotional program. Guide 12 indi-
cates that the supplier can limit the area of his promotion to that in which par-
ticipating customers sell. Although this means that a national distributor is not
required to initiate a promotional plan in Boston because he is "plugging" the
same product in San Francisco, the problem of "partial" or "fringe" competi-
tion is apparent.78 In Sun Cosmetic Shoppe, Inc. v. Elizabeth Arden Sales
Corp.,79 the court wanted to know, for purposes of damages, to what extent
customers of a New York retailer had been diverted to the favored New Jersey
stores. Although it can be argued that the omission of the word "competing"
from section 2(e) indicates a broader congressional purpose than 2(d), Sun
Cosmetic, where demonstrators were being furnished, suggests that this impor-
tant limitation is present in section 2(e) as well.8 0
Atalanta and related cases thus raise the issues of "spot" promotions and
special sales when goods are initially determined to be of "like grade and
quality." It may be, however, that Atalanta will only apply when product ac-
ceptability is not prevalent. Although not confined by its language to that
situation, the case in fact involved de minimis sales of newly introduced food
specialties.SI Business firms selling a general line traded under a uniform
brand name with a close subsitutionary relationship can expect the FTC to
continue finding a violation when allowances given one customer are not pro-
portionally available to others.8 2 That Atalanta has completely immunized the
under private brands. See the 2(a) Commission cases, United States Rubber Co., 28 F.T.C.
1489 (1939); Standard Oil Co., 41 F.T.C. 263 (1945). See generally AusriN, PRICE Dis-
CRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr 129-30 (rev. ed.
1959); Rowe, supra note 67, at 10-12.
78 Guide 10, Note specifically states that the seller "must be careful not to discriminate
against customers located on the fringes but outside the area selected for the special promo-
tion.... ." This line may be even more difficult to draw than one involving time. Cf. in
another connection the problems raised by Nachman v. Shell Oil Co., TRADE REG. REP.
(1945 Trade Cas.) 57361 (D. Md. 1945).
79 178 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1949) (L. Hand, J.).
80 There may be, however, a significant difference between proof in a private suit and the
area of competition in a FTC proceeding. See further discussion cf this problem in text
accompanying note 151 infra.
81 53 F.T.C. at 567 (testimony of Atalanta's vice president); 258 F.2d at 368 ("On the
basis of these three small and isolated transactions the Commission entered a sweeping cease
and desist order which places Atalanta injeopardy of contempt if it hereafter violates Section
2(d) in any fashion in any place in the country.") (Emphasis added.)
Whether de minimis or lack of public interest is a complete defense to a Robinson-Patman
Act charge is not altogether clear. See Webb-Crawford Co. v. FTC, 109 F.2d 268, 269 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 638 (1940); Rocky Mountain Wholesale Co., 52 FTC. 1484
(1956) (amount involved was $35.76). A recent answer to an FTC charge alleging violation of
§ 2(d), however, alleges de minimis sales. T. W. Holt & Co., No. 8371, FTC News Release,
June 9, 1961.
sz A Commission order in June 1961 rejected Giant Food's attempt to justify its induce-
ment of promotional allowances for the same "19th Anniversary Sale" present in Atalanta,
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national brand distributor from the requirement of proportionality on special
sales is not yet manifestly evident.
III. THE "CHmN LIGHTNING" PROMOTION AND INDIRECT BENEFiTS
Of particular promotional importance to the grocery industry is the use of
in-store advertising-whereby suppliers pay in whole or in part for counter and
window displays, shelf positions, dump displays and the like. These point-of-
sale promotions played an interesting part in the question as to whether certain
retailers were indirectly benefitted by payments to a third party in P. Lorillard
Co. v. FTC.83
In 1950 the sale of broadcasting time had become more difficult than usual,
with the result that broadcasting companies developed promotional schemes
to enable them to sell radio and television time to manufacturers and sellers of
grocery products. These plans, variously labelled "Chain Lightning," "Super-
marketing," and "Sell-A-Vision," only benefitted those chains which the
broadcasting companies selected. The plans first necessitated a contract with
certain chains whereby free radio and television time was offered in considera-
tion for the chains' agreement to conduct a specified number of week-long
promotional displays of as yet unspecified products in their stores. The broad-
casting companies then solicited food suppliers to purchase radio or television
time, offering, as an added inducement, a right to the in-store promotions al-
ready under contract. Although the brochures and circulars sent to the manu-
facturers contained details of the previous firm commitments by the particular
chains, the contracts between the producers and broadcasting companies were
at the standard rates and contained no reference to any other agreement.
The Third Circuit agreed with the Commission that the series of contracts
should be viewed as a whole, and held that the real question involved was
whether the sellers "have made payments to someone which actually are of
benefit to their customers... ."84 The court also rejected the argument that
payments are not made for the benefit of a customer within the meaning of
2(d) unless the seller either intends to benefit the customer or has reason to
on the basis that disfavored competitors did not buy wares ot "like grade and quality" adver-
tised in the Sale. Giant Food, Inc., No. 6459, FTC, June 1, 1961. The opinion stated that the
requisite presumption was present, for "the articles and brands advertised by Giant patently
included many whose names are household bywords throughout the country." Id. at 4. (Em-
phasis added.) Another recent FTC complaint against "Anniversary Sales" can be found in
Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co., No. 7718, FTC, October 10, 1960.
A charge under the section might be brought against a Delmcnte promotion of sliced
peaches not accorded to competing customers who carried only half-peaches. Whether the
FTC would complain if Delmonte promoted peaches but not pears is more difficult to assess.
83 267 F.2d 439 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 923 (1959).
8Id. at 444.
know that some benefit to him will proximately result.85 One judge dissented
on the ground that the execution of the agreements by the food suppliers was
not a contingency upon which the right of the chains to air time depended;
thus the "benefit" to the chains was too causally remote.8 6
A similar "indirect benefit" was present in a more recent case, Swanee
Paper Corp. v. FTC.87 By the device of payments to a third party, one retailer
received the benefit of almost free advertising. The dispute here arose out of a
series of arrangements involving Swanee, a manufacturer of paper products,
Grand Union, a customer of Swanee operating retail food stores, and Douglas
Leigh, Inc., the owner and operator of a giant electric animated advertising
sign located in Times Square. In 1952 Grand Union accepted the use of one
panel of the sign for a nominal fee of $50, in return for securing fifteen par-
ticipating advertisers to use the other panel. Swanee agreed with Grand Union
to become one of the participating advertisers, and as part of the discussions
with Grand Union, a schedule of in-store promotions of Swanee's products
was arranged. Although again the payments by the supplier were not made
directly to the chain store, the Second Circuit had no difficulty finding them to
be for the benefit of the retailer, and held that such payments were made in
consideration of services or facilities rendered "by or through" Grand
Union.88
s5 "This section of the Act does not concern itself with motive or intention. It is only con-
cerned with the consequences which flow from an act." Ibid.
Lorillard attempted to argue that the in-store promotions were nothing more than a
"premium," added to the sale of air time by the broadcasting companies. Brief for Peti-
tioner, pp. 23-24. The practice of offering a free tube of shaving cream with every sale of a
safety razor, however, does not seem in jeopardy under the decision. When a customer buys
a razor kit and accepts the premium, the benefit to the maker of the shaving cream seems too
remote to impose the burden of proportionality. For the Commission definition of "pre-
mium," see Walter J. Black, Inc., 50 F.T.C. 225 (1953). The premium problem has arisen in
another context under section 2(a). Cf. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, 363 U.S. 536 (1960).
86 "If the Commission's conception of 'benefit' is adhered to, the only way in which the
petitioner could have escaped the toils of the Clayton Act during the period when the broad-
casting companies were offering in-store promotions would have been either to forego com-
pletely advertising over the air through the broadcasting companies offering the promotions, or
to buy air time for all of petitioner's customers on a basis proportionately equal to that on
which the broadcasting companies had allotted air time to the chains." 267 F.2d at 448.
(Emphasis added.)
87 291 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1961).
88 Swanee's Brief unsuccessfully attempted to distinguish Lorillardon four grounds: that
any benefit was furnished by Douglas Leigh, and not, as in the earlier case, by the supplier;
that Grand Union was under no contractual obligation to furnish in-store promotions; that
nothing in the contract between Grand Union and Douglas Leigh was an inducement for
Swanee to enter into a rental agreement; and finally, that whereas in Lorillard the grocery
suppliers were informed of the arrangements between the broadcasting companies and the
chains, Swanee had no knowledge of the arrangement between Grand Union and Douglas
Leigh. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 30-38. It does not appear that Swanee's counsel was seriously
convinced they could avoid the precedent of Lorillard, for twenty-six of the thirty-eight page
brief was concerned with modification of the order and establishing discontinuance of the
practice.
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Despite allegations that the FTC in Lorillard was "experimenting with an
unprecedented theory,"89 both cases seem to be sound applications of the
statutory wording in 2(d). The language of the section does not specify either
the means whereby customers can be favored or the type of favoritism con-
demned. In referring to a "payment of anything of value to or for the benefit
of a customer" for services "by or through such customer," the section neces-
sarily carries the connotation that the unlawful acts could be accomplished by
using a third party or with the aid of an intermediary. 90
The concept of an "intermediary," however, is usually associated with the
brokerage provision, section 2(c). The intervention of a third party between
the seller and the favored buyer should not necessarily defeat the application
of section 2(d). Although the original FTC theory in Lorillard asserted an
"agency" relationship between the broadcasting companies and the sup-
pliers,91 the Hearing Examiner ruled that the discriminating suppliers in effect
"adopted" the original series of contracts with the chains. 92 The Third Circuit
properly went one step further and refused to view the different contracts sepa-
rately, but instead examined all the surrounding circumstances together. The
substance of respondents' actions, not their form, has governed Commission
and court decisions before.93 To decide otherwise might provide large loop-
holes for easy avoidance of the act.
One anomalous problem is evident, however, for in Lorillard the Commis-
sion complaint against the supplier under 2(d) collaterally implicated the net-
work sale of radio and television time, which standing alone apparently could
not be directly attacked under the Robinson-Patman Act. In the FTC's opin-
ion, sales of advertising space94 and broadcast time95 are beyond the coverage
of the act, as "commodity" is limited to merchandise in the conventional sense
89 Rowe, The Evolution of the Robinson-Patman Act: A Twenty- Year Perspective, 57
CoLUM. L. REv. 1059, 1084 n.155 (1957); see Rowe, How to Comply with Sections2(c)-(f),
in CCH ANTrmrusr LAw SyMposiuM 124, 135-36 n.47 (1957).
90 More essential to the question of "benefit" in the section is the State Wholesale
Grocers case, which could be interpreted as prohibiting all nonproportional payments with-
out regard to any benefit to the recipient customer. State Wholesale Grocers v. Great Atl. &
Pac. Tea Co., 258'F.2d 831, 837 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied sub nom. General Foods Corp.
v. State Wholesale Grocers, 358 U.S. 947 (1959). See Note, 72 HARv. L. Rnv. 1389 (1959).
It is more likely, however, that the court may have found a general benefit to A&P in the
form of good will and patronage. 258 F.2d at 834.
91 Appendix to Petitioner's Brief, p. 3a.
92 Id. at p. 133a.
93 See, e.g., the disregard of corporate form in the brokerage cases, Webb-Crawford Co.
v. FTC, 109 F.2d 268 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 638 (1940); Mississippi Sales Co.,
30 F.T.C. 1282 (1940); Thomas Page Mill Co., 33 F.T.C. 1437 (1941). Form has not gov-
erned in the "indirect customer" area either. See part IV infra.
94 81 CONG. REc. Ap. 2336 (1937).
95 Report of the Antitrust Subcommittee on the Television Broadcasting Industry of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1957).
of something tangible. Nevertheless, judicial dicta indicate that the issue is
still open. When the Government conceded in Times-Picayune that advertising
space was not a commodity under Section 3 of the Clayton Act, the Su-
preme Court commented, "We express no views on that statutory interpreta-
tation." 96 Thus, under prevailing interpretations, although section 2(d) would
not have been applicable to the transactions between CBS and the suppliers or
CBS and the grocery chains, the combination of contracts brought the supplier
under the section.
The Swanee opinion made clear that further judicial construction of "in-
direct benefit" may still arise. The court stated that, "There may be situations
where payments by a supplier to a third person indirectly benefit a customer of
the supplier and yet are not 'for the benefit' of the supplier within the mean-
ing of Section 2(d)."97 At least where the benefit is wholly dependent upon a
payment and the customer is an essential party to the entire transaction, the
Commission will have no difficulty in finding a violation. The "situations"
which the Swanee court may have had in mind are probably tied to that
court's further declaration that "we need not decide the.., question"98 of
whether a violation can exist if the respondent did not have knowledge that
a customer was being benefitted.99 There may then be some limitation on how
"indirectly" removed a benefit can be if innocence is interpolated into the
section.
The clearest example of an "indirect benefit" can be seen in the common
practice in certain industries 00 of making payments of "push money" directly
to salesmen, clerks, or demonstrators to devote special effort to the sale of
the payor's products. Any argument that only the salesmen are benefitted and
not their employers has been given short shrift by the Commission.101
A final note is warranted by the obverse of Swanee, where in Grand Union
Co.,102 the Commission for the first time held that a buyer's knowing induce-
96 Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 609-10 n.27 (1953).
Accord, Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 236 F.2d 522, 527 (2d Cir. 1956). Cf.
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
CBS appeared as amicus before the Third Circuit. The dissenting judge felt that because
the sales promotional plan of the broadcasting companies might have been economically
undesirable, or that the companies were beyond the reach of present law, was no reason for
making "a whipping boy" out of the respondent. 267 F.2d at 448.
97 291 F.2d at 836, citing the dissent in Lorillard.
98 Id. at 836.
99 The court did not have to decide the question for the record was found to have fully
supported the Commission's conclusion that Swanee knew or should have known it was
benefitting Grand Union.
100 The practice is especially prevalent in the cosmetics and related industries.
101 Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc., No. 6966, FTC, October 31, 1960 (prize monies). The
most recent complaint against disproportionate payments to store personnel can be found
in Regina Corp., No. 8421, FTC News Release, June 20, 1961.
102 No. 6973, FTC, August 12, 1960 (Tait, dissenting).
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ment of discriminatory advertising allowances constitutes an unfair trade
practice proscribed by Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.103
Grand Union, like Swanee, argued that section 2(d) was not applicable to the
sign program since payments made by the suppliers were for services rendered
by Douglas Leigh and any benefits Grand Union received were in considera-
tion for services rendered Douglas. This attempt to "artificially fragmentize
and compartmentalize an essentially unitary transaction" 104 was equally un-
successful. The co-ordinated industry-wide attack against the buyer in Grand
Union and the supplier in Swanee will prove to be an important development
in the indirect benefit situation as well as in the traditional direct benefit
tender of discriminatory allowances or services under sections 2(d) and 2(e).105
IV. TmE "INDIRECT CUSTOMER"
One real danger to an intelligent sales operation is hidden in the concept of
who is a customer or a purchaser under sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the act.
Guide 3 informs the supplier that:
A "customer" is someone who buys directly from the seller or his agent or
broker. Sometimes someone who buys from the customer may have such
a relationship with the seller that the law also makes him a customer of
the seller. In these Guides, the word "customer" which is used in section
2(d) of the law includes "purchaser" which is used in section 2(e).
The Commission theory of interchangeability has particular significance for
2(d), since payments prohibited by that section are payments to "a customer
of such person," meaning a customer of the person. making the payment,
whereas "purchaser" in 2(e) is not so limited.106 But the Commission and to
103 52 Stat. 111 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1958).
104 Grand Union Co., Opinion p. 11.
105 The omission of "services and facilities" from section 2(f)'s condemnation of a know-
ing inducement or reception of a "discrimination in price" was explained as inadvertant by
the draftor of that section. Dunn, Sections 2(d) and (e), in CCH ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT
SYmposIum 55, 61 (1946). Although the FTC apparently felt that they could not proceed
against the buyer under 2(f) for inducing a 2(d) violation, the Supreme Court in Automatic
Canteen left the question open: "We of course do not, in so reading § 2(f), purport to pass
on the question whether a 'discrimination in price' includes the prohibitions in such other
sections of the Act as §§ 2(d) and 2(e)." Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 73
n.14 (1953).
The Grand Union proceeding has not gone without criticism. See Oppenheim, Guides to
Harmonizing Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act with the Sherman and Clayton
Acts, 59 MicH. L. REv. 821, 839-45 (1961); Note, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act and Robinson-Patman Act Policy, 13 STAN. L. REv. 657 (1961). However, the principle of
Grand Union was applied in American News Co., No. 7396, FTC, January 10, 1961. For
additional use of this technique see the proceedings against both buyers and sellers in a
number of industries, including groceries, pipe and plumbing fixtures, and toys, cited in
Kintner, The Federal Trade Commission in 1960-Apologia Pro Vita Nostra, in CCH Airrx-
TRUST LAw SYMPosIUM 21, 32 nn.9-1 1 (1961).
106 See AUStin, op. cit. supra note 77, at 134-35.
some extent the courts have not construed 2(d) to be limited to purchasers
from the seller charged with a violation. This is the so-called "indirect pur-
chaser" or "indirect customer" concept. A person who as a matter of contract
law will not be considered a customer may be deemed a "customer" under the
act, just as the technical rules of contract law were held not to be binding in
the Lorillard and Swanee cases.
The notion of the "indirect customer" has generally arisen in the context of
other sections. Fair Trade contracts and the maintenance of a pricing policy
by the seller on his products made retailers who purchased from jobbers
"purchasers" under 2(e).107 In the Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp. case, retailers
were deemed "indirect purchasers" of the supplier who "by personally solicit-
ing them and by making effective its price policies and schedules"108 had taken
over the normal tasks of its intermediate distributor organization. Thus rigid
franchise control' 09 and resale price maintenance or perhaps suggested resale
prices when combined with other retailer contacts like missionary work, drop
shipments, and the like will be enough to create a customer relationship." 0
An initial construction of section 2(d) in this regard was made in Kay
Windsor Frocks, Inc."' There the FTC pierced the sales transactions and
found retailers buying through a Mutual Purchasing Syndicate "customers"
of the dress manufacturer."12 Indicative of the difficulties of definition, how-
ever, was the Commission's refusal to define "customer" in the order, for the
problems "attendant to [such] an undertaking... are obvious."113
Those cases, however, should be distinguished from the situation of
whether, absent supplier-retailer contact and control, a promotional allowance
to a direct buyer has to be offered on proportionally equal terms to whole-
salers whose customers compete with the direct buyer, or to the wholesaler's
customers who so compete. The Elizabeth Arden case held that services or
facilities furnished a direct purchaser had to be offered on proportionally
equal terms to competing "indirect purchasers" under 2(e).114 In Krug v. Inter-
107 Luxor, Ltd., 31 F.T.C. 658, 662-63 (1940).
108 25 F.T.C. 537 (1937) (section 2a).
109 See the Spark Plug cases, i.e., Champion Spark Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30 (1953); General
Motors Corp., 50 F.T.C. 54 (1953); Electric Auto-Lite Co., 50 F.T.C. 73 (1953).
110 See, e.g., Ronson Corp., 55 F.T.C. 1017 (1959). Charles Wesley Dunn stated that
the situations of sufficient direct merchandising relation included "where a manufacturer
suggests a resale price to or by the retailer; or where he solicits order from the retailer, to
be filled by a wholesaler; or where he makes drop shipments to the retailer, for the account
of a wholesaler; or where he gives the retailer any merchandising advice or assistance what-
ever." Dunn, supra note 105, at 63.
H1 51 F.T.C. 89 (1954).
112 Direct shipping of merchandise, direct billing and extending credit were sulficient to
establish the necessary course of dealing. Id. at 95.
113 Id. at 97.
114 Elizabeth Arden v. FTC, 156 F.2d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 806
(1947).
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national Tel. & Tel. Corp., a district court in 1956 held that a promotional al-
lowance paid a direct buying retailer must be made available to wholesalers
whose customers compete with the retailer receiving the allowance. 115 The
Krug court reasoned that the purpose of 2(d) was to place discriminatory al-
lowances on the same basis as price discriminations prohibited by 2(a)." 6Thus,
a payment is prohibited under 2(d) if, had it been a price discrimination, it
would be unlawful under 2(a). The finding of a violation in Krug because of the
wholesaler's "competing customers" must have rested on the unspoken as-
sumption that "customers competing" in the statute includes those buying
from the purchaser. It would appear from this case, then, that the supplier
must make payments available to wholesalers and retailers buying from the
wholesalers if he wishes to make payments to a retail chain purchasing
directly.a17
Considerable doubt was cast on this reasoning, however, in Klein v. Lionel
Corp.," 8 a section 2(a) case. The manufacturer had sold to a wholesaler and
t6 certain chains at the same price, but plaintiff retailer buying from the
wholesaler alleged he was discriminated against, because the wholesaler's
price with customary markup was necessarily higher than the chain store
price. The court ruled that a retailer buying through a supplier's wholesaler
was not a "purchaser" from the supplier. While Krug can be said to be con-
cerned merely with the discriminatory impact of a price and allowance dif-
ferential quoted and afforded direct purchasers, in Lionel no such differential
among direct purchasers existed.1 9 Lionel, however, definitely repudiated the
"indirect customer" concept in private damage litigation where the plaintiff
raised the question of resale price maintenance. For Lionel controlled resale
prices to the extent that it fixed a minimum under the Delaware Fair Trade
statute.12 0 The court rejected the earlier Commission cases to the contrary,121
stating that "a retailer who buys from a jobber does not become a purchaser
under Section 2(a)... merely because the products he deals in are Fair
Traded."122
When the cigarette industry's methods of distribution came under attack,
the FTC finally. faced the issue under section 2(d). The first series of cases
I's 142 F. Supp. 230 (D.NJ. 1956).
116 Id. at 236.
117 See Note, 72 HARv. L. REv. 385 (1958). Cyrus Austin has also agreed. AUSTIN, op. cit.
supra note 77, at 135; for the policy reasons, see Austin, Price Discrimination and the Small
Business Man, in 16 ABA ANTITRusT SECTION 94, 101-02 (1960).
11s 237 F.2d 13 (3d Cir.), affirming 138 F. Supp. 560 (D. Del. 1956).
I19 See the discussion in Rowe, Discriminatory Sales of Commodities in Commerce:
Jurisdictional Criteria under the Robinson-Patman Act, 67 YALE L.J. 1155, 1160-61 (1958).
120 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1901-07 (1953).
121 Luxor, Ltd., 31 F.T.C. 658 (1940); Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 25 F.T.C. 537 (1937).
122 237 F.2d at 16.
charged the cigarette manufacturers with establishing retailers as their own
customers by means of direct solicitation through missionary salesmen, al-
though delivery was through wholesalers.123 These cases were dismissed in
1948 for lack of evidence. In 1959, however, the Commission in Liggett &
Myers2 4 by a two to one decision (Chairman Kintner and Commissioner
Secrest not participating) in effect refused to follow Krug by upholding the
Examiner's ruling that the tobacco seller did not have more than 800,000
"indirect customers."125
The seller marketed cigarettes through direct dealing with wholesalers,
vending machine customers, and a small number of large retailers. Promo-
tional allowances were afforded the vending machine customers and some of
the direct buying retailers, but were not available to any wholesalers. The sup-
plier's contact with the alleged "indirect customers" who bought through
wholesalers included the employment of missionary men who visited some of
these outlets sporadically through the year arranging point-of-sale advertising
and displays. The missionary men also carried emergency stocks of cigarettes
to fill short supplies. The Examiner, however, refused to find the necessary
contact, and instead stressed that Liggett & Myers did not have any control
over the prices at which wholesalers sold to the retailers.126
On appeal to the Commission, the FTC counsel supporting the complaint
did not argue the indirect customer holding, although Commissioner Kern in
dissent felt that Krug should be followed. Instead, the main contention of
counsel was directed towards establishing competition between the vending
machine customers and the wholesalers. On this point the Commission held
that vending machine operators and the wholesalers did not cater to the same
class of customers and the functions each performed were significantly enough
different so that they were actually not in competition. 27 This aspect of the
case is important, for perhaps the trial staff felt that, if they could not establish
competition between the vending machine customers and the wholesalers, re-
tailers purchasing through the wholesalers did not warrant the protection of
123 See, e.g., P. Lorillard Co., 44 F.T.C. 1180 (1948); Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 44
F.T.C. 1183 (1948).
lZ4 Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., No. 6642, FTC, September 9, 1959 (Kern dissenting).
12s For discussion of the proceeding, both favorable and unfavorable, see Barton, Pro-
visions and Provisos, in CCH ANTITRUST LAw SYmpoSIUM 94, 105-07 (1960); Murray, The
Robinson-Patman Act: A Sampling of Advocacy, 10 BurrALo L. REv. 336, 350-51 (1961);
Shniderman, Collateral Discriminations under the Robinson-Patman Act-Section 2(c), (d)
and(e), in 17 ABA ArITRusr SEcrION 410,416-17 (1960); Austin, supra note 117, at 101-02.
126 Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., No. 6642, FTC, November 26, 1958 (initial decision).
The lack of control over wholesale prices should be contrasted with the earlier charge
against the tobacco companies, where orders that missionary men secured were allegedly
at prices named by the manufacturer. See note 123 supra.
127 This holding was somewhat surprising since it was clear that there was competition
for outlets in bars and grills, where the retailer, if he installed a vending machine, would stop
dealing with the wholesaler.
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payments proportional to that afforded the vending machine operators.
Liggett & Myers, then, in its broadest interpretation may be read as requir-
ing some fair trading activity, regular drop shipments and missionary men
work, and a measure of control over pricing policies before an "indirect cus-
tomer" will be found. Alternatively, anything more than just minor missionary
work might bring the supplier under the ambit of the section. The FTC may
have recognized the impracticality of forcing the supplier to proportionalize
payments to 216 vending machine customers among 800,000 retailers.128 But
practical economics aside, the issue remains alive and the hazy outline of who
is an "indirect customer" still remains to be sketched in.
Elizabeth Arden and Krug, however, may still have some vitality, despite
Lionel and the Commission affirmance but not discussion of the Examiner's
ruling in Liggett & Myers. When a distribution system approaches being a
mere conduit, it is clearly appropriate to invoke the "indirect customer" the-
ory.' 29 But when the retailer attempts to establish a customer relationship
with the supplier only because he is competing with a direct buyer, the use of
2(d) may not be warranted. The Commission has never urged this theory of
the private suits, for it has only found an indirect customer when it feels some
degree of control over the transactions or sufficient contacts with the retailer
are present. The language of the statute suggests that section 2(d) should be
applied only in the latter situations.
V. Tim MEEING-CowPrLmON DuENSE
It is suggested that the first problem the Supreme Court will agree to pass
on under section 2(d) is also the most puzzling and troublesome. That is,
whether the meeting-competition defense of section 2(b), admittedly available
under section 2(e),130 is also available in a 2(d) proceeding. It is clear that a
literal reading of section 2(b) indicates that it only applies to the seller's
furnishing of services or facilities:
[N]othing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima
fade case... by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of services
or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to
128 Other practical problems are suggested in Shniderman, supra note 125, at 416-17.
It does appear, however, that concessions might be manipulated to direct buying chains
to frustrate the nondiscriminatory purpose of the section. Perhaps in some cases a contrary
ruling in line with the suggestion in Krug might be a desirable result, for it is the retailers who
need protection against the competing chains that can buy directly more easily.
129 See American News Co., No. 7396, FTC, Jan. 10, 1961, which describes the distribu-
tion system for magazine and paperback books, concluding that the intermediary was only a
conduit.
130 Guide 14. No proceeding to reach the federal courts has turned on such a defense by a
seller charged with violation of § 2(e). In the Arden case, however, the defense was offered
and rejected as inconsistent with the facts. Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. FTC, 156 F.2d 132 (2d
Cir. 1946). Cf. FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 67 (1959) (dictum).
meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities
furnished a competitor.131
The plain meaning of the words, however, has not always been evident to
those administering the statute.
The issue in its pristine form arose in the Carpel case, where a Hearing
Examiner treated the defense substantively,132 but found against the respond-
ent. The seller's methods were held to be an aggressive rather than a defensive
measure to meet specific loss of sales.133 The same Hearing Examiner's deter-
mination of the availability of the defense, however, was held to be error by
the Commission in 1956 in Henry Rosenfeld, Inc.134 The FTC position had
been foreshadowed in a brokerage provision decision by the Third Circuit. 3t 5
Considerable confusion regarding the validity of this determination was fos-
tered by the inconsistent positions taken by the Commission in its 1959 briefs
before the Supreme Court in Simplicity Pattern. As petitioner in that case it
asserted that "The proviso to § 2(b) clearly creates a meeting-competition de-
fense to §§ 2(d) and (e) as well as to § 2(a)."13 6 Realizing the danger of such a
statement, the Commission on the cross-appeal backtracked, stating, "It is not
clear whether § 2(b) and its proviso apply also to charges under § 2(d)."137 The
1960 Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc. case, with one Commissioner dissenting,
reaffirmed the holding that the 2(b) defense is available under section 2(e) but
not under 2(d).138 Since a petition for review of the FTC's decision is pend-
ing,139 it would be helpful to marshal the arguments on both sides before
making any determination on the merits.
Of considerable importance in favor of the Commission's stand, of course,
is the express language of section 2(b).140 In addition, the legislative history
131 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1958). (Emphasis added.)
132 Carpel Frosted Foods, Inc., 48 F.T.C. 581, 597-98 (1951).
133 This holding was in line with the cases where the defense was rejected in a 2(a) situa-
tion. See the discussion in EDWARDs, Tim PRICE DISCRMINATION LAw 552 (1959).
134 52 F.T.C. 1535, 1549-52 (1956).
135 "For example the language of paragraph (b) relates to proceedings brought pursuant
to the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (e) but are not applicable to proceedings instituted
under paragraphs (c) or (d)." Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667, 677 (3d Cir.
1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1940) (dicta).
136 Brief for the FTC, p. 17 (No. 406).
137 Brief for the FTC, p. 23 n.9 (No. 447). At any rate, the question was in fact immaterial
to the issues in both appeals.
138 No. 6966, FTC, October 31, 1960 (Tait, dissenting). This was the first case involving
violations of both sections in which the availability of the 2(b) defense was raised.
139 The case is pending in the District of Columbia Circuit. Commissioner Kern has now
joined the minority position. See Shulton, Inc., No. 7721, FTC, July 25, 1961. A Florida
district court, citing no authority, has on motion upheld the defense. Delmar Constr. Co.
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., TRADE R G. REP. 69947 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 24,1961).
140 See note 131 supra.
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could be termed exiguous at minimum. The "services and facilities" amend-
ment to the meeting-competition defense took form during the Senate de-
bates and culminated in Senate passage of a bill containing only the present
section 2(d).141 As initially proposed the defense appeared at the end of the
bill, but was later renumbered and placed immediately after section 2(a), then,
as now, relating only to direct and indirect price discrimination.142 No clear
explanation was made by either the Senator or Representative introducing the
amendment as to why the language was added,143 but discussion of the proviso
in Congress appears to have been limited to situations involving price dis-
crimination. Representative McLaughlin, however, did state that the amend-
ment "simply allows a seller to meet not only competition in price of other
competitors but also competition in services and facilities furnished."144
Furthermore, it is arguable that the sections are consistent and logical in
their independent dealing with specified practices. Obvious differences be-
tween a seller furnishing a service or facility and his providing only the re-
muneration for the various promotional activities of his customers can be
shown. For example, in Lorillard, the food supplier could not have furnished
free radio and television time, but could pay for its being furnished by the
broadcasting companies. Also, a violation of section 2(e) has been found in the
same case where a manufacturer's practices were not held to violate 2(d).14s
Finally, when the sections have been read in pari materia, as for example
reading in "commerce" 146 and "like grade and quality,"147 such requirements
are generally jurisdictional and not substantive.
The conirary position depends on persuading the court of the patent ab-
surdity of reading companion sections independently. Parallel interpretation
may be said to be essential to sections expressing the same policy and dealing
with essentially the same transactions. "Available" and "accorded," "pur-
chaser" and "customer" are two examples of parallel reading.148 The sections
differ only in that they apply to different methods by which services and facili-
ties may be furnished, and this distinction has not always been maintained.149
'41 80 CONG. REc. 8418-19 (1936).
142 Ibid.
43 See the remarks of Senator Moore in 80 CONG. Rsc. 6435 (1936) and Representative
Miller in 80 CONG. REc. 8139-40 (1936).
144 80 CONG. Rxc. 8224-25 (1936). (Emphasis added.)
145 General Foods Corp., 52 F.T.C. 798 (1956).
146 Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1945).
147 Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958).
14 8 See Arr'Y GEN. NAT'L COmm. ANTITrusr REP. 189 (1955).
149 For example, the early Arden cases regarded thefurnishing of demonstrators as both a
2(d) and 2(e) violation, since the supplier paid their salaries. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v.
Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1945); Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. FTC, 156 F.2d 132
(2d Cir. 1946).
In addition, the legislative history could arguably indicate that the "services
and facilities" amendment to 2(b) had to refer to section 2(d), since the amend-
ment was in both the House and Senate bills while 2(d) was present, but before
2(e) was added. Finally, proponents of this view can point to the fact that all
writers and commentators prefer the reconciliation of the two sections.150
By confining its interpretation to the precise language of 2(b), the Commis-
sion, however, may be charged with an untenable inconsistency. Nowhere in
section 2(e) is "purchasers" qualified by the 2(d) limitation of "competing,"
although the FTC reads the sections together with regard to this crucial
point.151 Ironically, a determination contrary to the FTC position on "com-
peting" would certainly be a strong precedent in favor of the Commission's
reading of 2(b) as it relates to 2(d). It is arguable, however, that if "compet-
ing" purchasers can be read as a jurisdictional requirement in 2(e), any al-
leged inconsistency is thereby minimized.
It is submitted that the Commission position on the meeting-competition
defense is the sounder of the two alternatives, especially in light of previous
Supreme Court decisions. The Standard Oil case in 1950 followed the precise
language of 2(b) in construing that section as a complete defense,152 despite
legislative history clearly indicating that Congress felt the defense was strictly
procedural. 53 Equally important, the Simplicity Court stated, "We cannot
supply what Congress has studiously omitted."154 Since 2(b) refers only to the
seller's furnishing of facilities or services and not to the 2(d) situation where
the buyer is doing the furnishing, the above quoted language would be difficult
to avoid. Finally, the Broch case in 1960 indicated that little attention would
be given arguments that attempt to justify a statutory interpretation on the
basis of its economic desirability.' 55
15O Rowe, supra note 89, at 133 n.40; Fisher, supra note 11, at 456-57; FELDMAN & ZORN,
op. cit. supra note 11, at 129-30; AusTiN, op. cit. supra note 77, at 120,123 (by implication).
151 Guide 12. The courts also appear to regard this requirement as basic to a violation of
2(e). See, e.g., United Cigar-Whelan Stores Corp. v. H. Weinreich Co., 107 F. Supp. 89, 91
(S.D.N.Y. 1952) (dicta).
If "competing" were not read into section 2(e), such a result would broaden FTC author-
ity to strike at territorial discrimination in the furnishing of services and facilities just ab it
can do in territorial price discrimination under section 2(a). One commentator regards this
authority, assuming the prima facie 2(a) requirements, as necessary to protect the purposes
of the Robinson-Patman Act. Austin, supra note 117, at 97.
152 Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1950). There is additional irony here, how-
ever, for the majority in Standard Oilwas softening the thrust of a basically anti-competition
act, while the literal reading of section 2(b) as it applied to 2(d) would have the opposite
result.
15S3 Id. at 251 (Reed, J., dissenting).
154 FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 67 (1959).
155 FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 177 (1960). Broch also showed that at the
least a majority of the court might hesitate to overturn a "settled administrative practice."
Ibid. If Commission interpretation had been less confused as to the question under discus-
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This result, of course, does not mean that a rigid application of section 2(d)
viUi stifle the flexibility of promotional allowances. As shown by the Atalanta
ase, allowances on the first sale of a product can be adjusted on subsequent
ales as long as the latter transactions are not in competition with the
ormer. 156 If the omission of payments for services from the 2(b) defense was
eally inadvertent, it should be left to Congress to change the words, and not
he couits. Thus, there appears to be a valid distinction between adding a word
)mitted and altering unambiguous language.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is evident that there is much in section 2(d) to give rise to legal dispute.
3ome accommodation between the underlying intention of the section and the
,ractical requirements of the business world may be seen in the Atalanta and
Liggett & Myers cases, and to some extent in the Guides. That this accom-
modation, however, will ever be a happy one is open to serious doubt. A
;tudy of Commission activity under the act from May through July, 1961, indi-
ates that the charges under the advertising allowance section are three to four
times more frequent than those brought under other sections.15 7 Whether this
indicates heretofore unnoticed violations in the business community or novel
experimentation in new procedures and theories by the Commission is not
altogether clear. Whatever the reason, it is manifest that important litigation
testing the outer limits and internal workings of the section will be forth-
coming.
sion, this additional reason could be given for predicting the Supreme Court's probable
resolution of the problem.
156 The circuit court felt that the FTC construction of the "spot" sales five months apart
as "competing" would mean "any allowance given on the first sale could never be adjusted
to meet competition." Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365, 371 (3d Cir. 1958).
(Emphasis added.) The quoted statement does not mean that the court was reading into
2(d) the defense of meeting competition.
157 See FTC News Releases, May 1, 1961-July 31, 1961.
